SOURCE DOCUMENTS: THE CABLES, IN FULL
- Special Correspodent
- 2 days ago
- 18 min read
This article is a direct response to "THE EVICTION FILE: FROM THE FIRST ORDER TO TODAY" (published on St. Sava Parish News) and to the reader comments beneath it. Several commenters have accused the author of fabricating or misquoting documents, claiming that the published sources actually "prove Bishop Irinej helped Serbia keep Kosovo."
To remove any doubt and end the speculation, below are all five U.S. diplomatic cables in full. Read them yourself, and see exactly what they say.
Since some readers have questioned whether these cables exist, were read, or were quoted accurately — here they are, in their entirety.
These are five U.S. State Department diplomatic cables, originally published by WikiLeaks and available at wikileaks.org/plusd/. As official records authored by U.S. government employees in the course of their duties, these cables carry no copyright (17 U.S.C. §105) and are reproduced here in full. Nothing has been trimmed, summarized, or altered. Each cable's canonical WikiLeaks ID is provided so any reader can independently verify the text below against the original source.
We are publishing all five in full — not just the passages that support our reporting — because that is what “read it yourself” actually means.
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CABLE 1: “SERBIA: STATE AND CHURCH REMAIN IN LOCKSTEP ON KOSOVO”
Canonical ID: 06BELGRADE879_a
Date: June 2, 2006, 08:11
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
From: U.S. Embassy Belgrade
To: Secretary of State, Defense Intelligence Agency, and others
Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)1. (C) Summary: Despite the impression of improved atmospherics following the May 23 Vienna talks on religious issues, Prime Minister Kostunica continues to work with more conservative elders in the Church to derail efforts by moderate elements to define a balanced and independent SOC position on Kosovo status. The results of the SOC Assembly of Bishops (May 15-27) may also reinforce this effort by opening the way for hard-liners to take important senior posts in the SOC hierarchy. We will continue to work for ways to strengthen SOC moderates including ways such as the Ambassador,s upcoming Contact Group/Quint level with the SOC Kosovo team. End Summary.2. (C) On May 26, soon to be Bishop Irinej (Dobrijevic) (strictly protect throughout) met with poloff in the wake of the May 23 Vienna talks on religious issues in Kosovo. Irinej (Dobrijevic) was elected Bishop during an assembly of SOC Bishops held in Belgrade from May 15-27 and appointed to preside over Australia and New Zealand, but he is not likely to depart for his new assignment until the fall. As reported in reftel, Irinej (Dobrijevic) is a moderate voice within the Church and has confided his deep concern that the PM is using his influence in the Church to ensure full SOC support for the government,s position in the Kosovo status talks. His appointment as Bishop to Australia and New Zealand has effectively promoted him away from the center of SOC power while keeping his useful ties to Orthodox diaspora groups (and their associated funding sources) in hand. He has assured us that he will seek to remain engaged on Kosovo and in Belgrade until the final settlement.SOC reaction to the Vienna talks--------------------------------3. (C) Irinej (Dobrijevic) downplayed reports of an improved atmosphere at the May 23 round of talks (senior GOS negotiator Leon Kojen called it “useful and productive”) and offered signs of a continuing effort by the PM to keep the SOC delegates in step with his policy on Kosovo. The composition of the SOC delegation in Vienna, Irinej (Dobrijevic) said, showed how the SOC had been co-opted. He called Bishop Tedosije the lone voice of moderation and said he was mostly marginalized by his superiors, Bishop Irinej of Backa and Bishop Artemije (Embassy note: Irinej (Dobrijevic) has recounted to us in the past how Irinej of Backa has worked openly and sometimes impatiently with senior government officials to silence more moderate voices in the Church. Amfilohije has also reportedly worked behind the scenes in a similar manner. End Embassy note). Bishop Artemije was particularly unhelpful in the aftermath of the May 23 talks by blasting the UNOSEK process in an interview with Belgrade daily Glas Javnosti on May 25. He declared he was “fed up with Albanian promises” and said there was “no progress” at the talks because UNOSEK is “not paying much attention to the results.”Meanwhile, the Synod hardens----------------------------4. (C) The outcome of the recent SOC Assembly of Bishops also suggests a hardening of the Holy Synod. In particular, Irinej (Dobrijevic) noted the “astounding” appointment of Bishop Filaret to the Synod, a person who he described as from the extreme right wing of the SOC and one of the only SOC clergy to insist on giving a eulogy at the funeral of Slobodan Milosevic. Irinej (Dobrijevic) told other Emboffs that the election of other new members of the Synod — particularly “Bishops from Bosnia” — would likely result in a harder-line SOC leadership. Irinej (Dobrijevic) said that the SOC leadership's top priority (including Patriarch Pavle, Metropolitan Amfilohije) is to keep PM Kostunica in power so as to avoid a Radical government — he called an SRS government a “nightmare scenario” for the Church.5. (C) According to Irinej (Dobrijevic), Irinej of Backa has attempted to make political inroads with President Tadic to bring the SOC leadership close with the DS leadership (as it is with the DSS). According to Irinej (Dobrijevic), Tadic reportedly shouted at Irinej of Backa that the DS was not interested in these kinds of ties. Irinej (Dobrijevic) said that Irinej of Backa had never been so directly rebuffed by a GOS official. In fact, Irinej (Dobrijevic) told us of one occasion where Irinej of Backa reprimanded the PM for some offense in front of his closest advisors, warning Chief of Staff Nikitovic to stay out of the discussion. Tadic,s reported refusal to develop a relationship with Irinej of Backa may also be related to the fact that Tadic is working behind the scenes with senior Church moderates in an effort to influence the Patriarch,s succession.6. (C) According to Irinej (Dobrijevic), the Bishop from Backa is often deployed by the Church or by the government as an interlocutor because he is perceived to be a moderate; in reality, says Irinej (Dobrijevic), he often presents different sides to different audiences. Irinej (Dobrijevic) said that Irinej of Backa behaved accordingly in Vienna — saying “all the right things” during the talks but reverting to a hard-line stance when back in the company of his Bishop colleagues.7. (C) Comment: Father Irinej (Dobrijevic),s observations provide some important insights into the complex in-fighting among the SOC,s hierarchy, a struggle that has only intensified with Patriarch Pavle,s increasingly frail health and rumors about succession. Father Irinej (Dobrijevic),s effort to forge a realistic, practical, and apolitical SOC position on Kosovo (and other issues of interest to the international community) has had to navigate difficult currents. His work in that regard has strained his relationship with the PM and raised suspicions about his motives among more conservative SOC leaders. We cannot rule out that his frustrations also color his description of developments within the SOC. The PM sees only trouble if the SOC position on Kosovo differs from his own, and he will do his best to ensure people who agree with him stay in charge of the Church. End Comment.POLT
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CABLE 2: “RIFT WIDENS BETWEEN HARD-LINE AND MODERATE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH FACTIONS IN KOSOVO”
Canonical ID: 06PRISTINA495_a
Date: June 9, 2006, 17:07
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
From: U.S. Office Pristina
To: Secretary of State, Defense Intelligence Agency, and others
B. 05 PRISTINA 58 - C C. PRISTINA 24 D. BELGRADE 879 E. PRISTINA 494Classified By: COM PHILIP S. GOLDBERG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Ever since moderate Bishop Teodosije welcomed Kosovo President Sejdiu to Decani Monastery on Orthodox Easter, the rift between Teodosije and hard-line Bishop Artemije has widened. After the visit, Artemije blasted Teodosije in the media, and the hardline Serbian National Council backed Artemije up. A letter from a Gracanica priest to the Synod in Belgrade criticizing Artemije appeared on the internet, and assailants shot at the priest's vehicle while he and his family drove through the Serb-majority municipality of Zvecan. Evidently in reaction to the rift, Bishop Teodosije attempted to resign from his position as the church's spokesperson in Kosovo, and a key moderate monk, Father Nektarije, left the clergy altogether. The situation has made Orthodox Kosovo Serbs increasingly tense, especially after a Kosovo police service officer and cadet were suspended in connection with the attack on the priest's vehicle. END SUMMARY.2. (SBU) Despite their traditional religious relationship as spiritual father and son, a rift developed in 2005 between moderate Bishop Teodosije Sibalic of Lipljan, of Decani Monastery, and hard-line Bishop Artemije Radosavljevic, head of the Raska and Prizren Diocese. At the time, Artemije refused to participate in the Reconstruction Implementation Commission (RIC) developed to oversee the reconstruction of Orthodox Churches destroyed in the March 2004 riots (Ref B). Belgrade Church officials stepped in and selected Teodosije to participate on the RIC, and to represent the church in Kosovo to the international community and to the SOC Synod. The RIC successfully completed preliminary interventions in late December 2005, and tenders for the next phase of reconstruction will be launched in June and July, with work scheduled to begin this summer (Ref C).3. (SBU) Relations between Artemije and Teodosije soured further when Teodosije welcomed Kosovo Albanian President Fatmir Sejdiu to Decani Monastery for Orthodox Easter on April 23, 2006 (Ref C). Several days earlier, Bishop Artemije had publicly refused Prime Minister Agim Ceku's request to visit Gracanica monastery on Orthodox Easter, saying such a visit would not be welcomed while displaced Kosovo Serbs (including Artemije himself) still cannot return to their homes.4. (SBU) On April 26, Artemije blasted the decision by Decani monks to welcome Sejdiu on Easter in an article published on the diocese web site, saying the visit took place without Artemije's blessing and created a false impression that things were improving in Kosovo. Teodosije responded in an article posted on the Decani website, saying he had discussed the visit in advance with Artemije and Artemije agreed that a short visit and traditional Easter drink with international visitors would be acceptable. (NOTE. Marija Gavric, close family friend and former protocol assistant to Bishop Artemije told PolOff on June 9 that Artemije suffers from extremely poor health and is getting senile, often forgetting things from one day to the next. END NOTE.)5. (SBU) In the statement, Teodosije said he also discussed the visit with a high official from the state institutions in Belgrade, who told Teodosije that it would not be a problem if Sejdiu visited as a guest, as long as there was no political discussion. Belgrade officials criticized Teodosije several months ago when Kosovo Albanian politician Veton Surroi visited Decani monastery as part of his outreach to Kosovo's minority communities.6. (SBU) On April 27 the hard-line Serbian National Council (SNC) issued a press statement sharply criticizing Teodosije and moderate Serb politician Oliver Ivanovic for welcoming Sejdiu to Decani on Easter, and fully endorsing Artemije's decision to refuse Ceku. The SNC stated that Teodosije was “not authorized to speak on behalf of the Christian Serbs of Kosovo, the vast majority of whom disagree” with him, and asked Teodosije and Ivanovic to “desist at once from their words and actions that give comfort and encouragement to those who seek our destruction.” They also asked Teodosije and other SOC representatives not to participate in the interfaith conference that took place at the Pec Patriarchate on May 2-3, saying it was, “hollow to speak of 'dialogue' with Islamic representatives while jihad terrorists plot the destruction of Christian churches they have not already burned, blown up or desecrated.”7. (SBU) Showing just how out of touch the SNC is with the SOC, high level SOC representatives, including Teodosije, Metropolitan Amfilohije, hard-liner Bishop Irinej (Bulovic) of Backa, and then Heiromonk (now Bishop) Irinej (Dobrijevic), not only attended the conference, but hosted it (Ref D). Representatives of the Catholic, Islamic, Protestant and Jewish communities also participated. Artemije was notably absent. In a common statement issued afterwards, the participants acknowledged that, “all communities have suffered,” they further condemned “the destruction of all churches, mosques, cemeteries and other religious sites,” and commended the restoration process.8. (SBU) Afterwards a letter sharply criticizing Artemije for his statements against Teodosije appeared on a Serbian Orthodox Church internet forum, purportedly signed by Father Srdjan (Stankovic), secretary of the Raska and Prizren diocese, along with diocesan officials from Prizren, Pristina, Mitrovica and Gnjilane. The letter says that believers and clergy are greatly confused by the clashes in the media between Artemije and Teodosije, and urged church leaders to be more engaged in seeking solutions.9. (C) On May 6 assailants shot at Father Srdjan's vehicle while he was driving with his family through the village of Rudare, in Zvecan municipality in northern Kosovo. Senior UN Civil Police official Grey Ferguson confirmed to E/P Chief on June 9 that a Kosovo Police Service special unit officer and KPS cadet were suspended on June 7 in connection with the incident. Father Sava of Decani Monastery told PolOff on June 8 that Srdjan told him that he has taken his family and left Kosovo, on advice from CivPol.10. (SBU) Teodosije and Artemije both participated at the May 23 status negotiations meeting on cultural heritage in Vienna on May 23. Gavric told PolFSN that during the May 15-27 Holy Assembly in Belgrade, Bishop Teodosije attempted to resign from his position on the RIC and as the authorized spokesperson for the church on matters related to Kosovo because of the ongoing rift with Artemije. She said the assembly refused his resignation, asserting that SOC interests are beyond any individual.11. (C) On June 2 USOP received an email from Father Nektarije (Isak Vorgucic), a Decani monk, saying that he was leaving the clergy. Vorgucic said he was leaving for entirely personal reasons (having met a woman), but would continue his work as executive director and editor-in-chief of Radio KIM. Gavric later told PolFSN, however, that Vorgucic actually left the clergy due to the internal dispute between Artemije and Teodosije.12. (SBU) Artemije has other problems brewing as well. Gavric said the SOC is currently investigating possible misuse of diocese funds by Artemije's personal assistant and close advisor, Father Simeon. Artemije appointed Simeon Abbot of Banjska Monastery in Zvecan in 2005, and Simeon is closely associated with northern SNV hard-liners. According to Gavric, Simeon was personally behind Artemije's refusal to participate on the RIC, because Simeon wanted all reconstruction funds to be channeled through the diocese budget, without any external oversight.13. (SBU) COMMENT. The public rift in the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo is adding to the overall distress felt by Kosovo Serbs. While they are used to conflicts among political leaders, they expect more from their religious leaders. Artemije has firmly aligned himself with the hard-line SNC, and together they oppose any attempts at reconciliation with Kosovo Albanians. Despite his radical views, Artemije does have significant support among the population. END COMMENT.14. (U) Post clears this message in its entirety for release to Special Envoy Ahtisaari.GOLDBERG
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CABLE 3: “KOSOVO: GETTING REAL WITH SERBIAN OPINION MAKERS”
Canonical ID: 06BELGRADE964_a
Date: June 16, 2006, 14:33
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
From: U.S. Embassy Belgrade
To: Secretary of State and others
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: COMs of Contact Group countries and the UN told influential Serbian opinion makers that the GOS must do more to prepare its citizens for the likely outcome of Kosovo's final status. The UN and Contact Group stand ready to assist Serbia to get through the Kosovo settlement and become a stable, strong, and prosperous European state. List of Serbian attendees in paragraph 11. END SUMMARY.2. (SBU) On June 14, at the French Residence, the Ambassador and the Director of the UN Office in Belgrade joined the French Ambassador over lunch with influential Serbian opinion makers to convey the message that (1) the Contact Group fully supports the UNOSEK-led Kosovo final status process, (2) the GOS — and by implication other opinion makers — must do more right now to prepare Serbs for the likely outcome of Kosovo's final status and (3) the Contact Group and UN stand ready to assist Serbia to get through the Kosovo settlement and become a stable, strong, and prosperous European state.UN lays it out--------------3. (SBU) UN Office Director Harston reported that UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari expects the status of Kosovo to be resolved by the end of 2006, and that in mid-July he will present a report to the UNSC containing “no surprises.”GOS strategy is ineffective and unclear---------------------------------------4. (SBU) The consensus of the attendees was that the GOS is not open enough regarding its rationale and expectations from the talks, and that the GOS negotiating team is not presenting its case effectively. Ivan Vejvoda said the GOS team had a “seminar” approach to the talks. Ambassador Pernet noted how the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) had been able to formulate and publish a platform while the GOS had not. DANAS Editor Ramac said the SOC had a history of being more willing to engage, citing the SOC's willingness to encourage dialogue and cooperation with UNMIK and KFOR after 1999. Father Irinej said he was heartened by the lack of “public outrage” to his June 7 interview with Belgrade daily Glas Javnosti. (Note: Irinej was the first SOC official to imply publicly that there must be preparations made for the possibility of an independent Kosovo. End note.)Serbian public is not engaged with negotiations------------------------------------------------6. (SBU) Ambassador Polt stressed that when Kosovo's final status is determined, the lack of practical engagement by the GOS will likely lead to a settlement package being presented which the majority of the IC would find acceptable. Ambassador Pernet said one of the most troubling aspects of how the GOS is handling negotiations now is the “lack of public debate” on the issue. POLITIKA editor Smajlovic agreed, saying she was “ashamed” that frank discussions on Kosovo status are occurring at foreign embassies in Belgrade, but not with the GOS.7. (SBU) Smajlovic nevertheless expressed dismay at the CG's implied “act of God” approach to the negotiations outcome. She agreed that the DS and DSS will suffer politically if the lack of public debate would lead to confusion and outrage if Kosovo independence is announced. Ivanovic said cynically that perhaps “six years of democracy” is not enough for people to know to demand more transparency. Vejvoda said the GOS itself does not understand that there is a “cost for peace and stability” which is the abandonment of extreme positions.GOS has proven inflexible--------------------------8. (SBU) Harston expressed dismay that both President Tadic and Prime Minister Kostunica were presenting the same inflexible position on Kosovo status as Milosevic did with eastern Slavonia, and that on Kosovo, the public stance of the DS and DSS is no different from that of the Radicals. Kosovo Serb leader Ivanovic added that the GOS negotiators cannot hope to achieve any measure of success with “just saying no.”Possible outcomes-----------------9. (U) Vejvoda sought to frame a possible Serbian reaction to Kosovo independence in a historical context. He said that when PM Djindjic made efforts in January 2003 to address Kosovo status, it was the international community that had said his moves were premature. However, despite public opinion being against compromise or reduced sovereignty over Kosovo, Vejvoda said that there was a “sense of relief” among the public that the issue was finally being addressed at all.10. (SBU) Comment: The purpose of this lunch was to impress upon influential policy makers a similarly realistic message we tell Tadic and Kostunica: the Contact Group and UNOSEK are unified, and time is overdue to prepare for “the day after” a settlement of Kosovo status. The GOS is either unwilling or unable (or both) to inform its citizens of the probable outcome for Kosovo, but this should not deter other opinion makers from working to help the Serbian people better understand an unwelcome reality.11. (U) Attendees:US/France/UN: French Ambassador Hugues PERNET (host); Ambassador Michael POLT; Mr. Julian HARSTON, Director, UN Office in Belgrade; LTC Thierry NAVREZ, French Defense Attache; Mr. Didier LARROQUE, PolOff, French Embassy (notetaker); Mr. Demian SMITH, PolOff, US Embassy (notetaker)Serbs: Bishop-Elect Father Irinej DOBRIJEVIC, Serbian Orthodox Church; Mr. Ivan VEJVODA, Director, Balkan Trust for Democracy; Ms. Ljiljana SMAJLOVIC, Editor-in-Chief, POLITIKA; Mr. Mihajlo RAMAC, Editor-in-Chief, DANAS; Ms. Duska ANASTASIJEVIC, Reporter, VREME; Mr. Oliver IVANOVIC, Chair, Serb List for Kosovo and MetohijaPOLT
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CABLE 4: “MODERATE KOSOVO CHURCH LEADERS, UNOSEK AND PRISTINA AGREE IN SUBSTANCE ON CHURCH PROTECTIONS”
Canonical ID: 06PRISTINA614_a
Date: July 21, 2006, 16:40
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
From: U.S. Office Pristina
To: Secretary of State and others
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, PROTECT ACCORDINGLY1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Father Sava told PolOff that he personally supports UNOSEK proposals for the protection of cultural heritage. He said the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), however, cannot support the proposals publicly so long as the government in Belgrade continues to oppose them. Sava criticized recent statements by hard-line Bishop Artemije in the U.S., and lamented that moderate Bishop Irinej is being sent off to Australia during status talks. END SUMMARY.2. (SBU) On July 20, PolOff attended the weekly memorial service for Serbian King Stefan Decanski (St. Stefan) at Decani Monastery, a UNESCO World Heritage site in western Kosovo. During the service, Father Sava Janjic and 20 of his fellow monks chanted hymns to the remains of St. Stefan, who founded the monastery in 1330. The service is open to the public, and at least 20 Kosovo Serbs of all ages attended.3. (SBU) Sava told PolOff that he personally supports proposals made by the office of the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo (UNOSEK) on the protection of Kosovo's cultural heritage. Sava is a close advisor to Bishop Teodosije, who attended the recent negotiating session on cultural heritage in Vienna. Sava said that the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) cannot publicly support the UNOSEK proposals so long as Belgrade continues to oppose them, and he criticized what he views as Belgrade's attempts to prevent progress on this issue. He lamented that newly-appointed moderate Bishop Irinej Dobrijevic is being “sent off to the farthest possible place” (Australia) when his services are most needed during status negotiations.4. (SBU) Sava criticized Bishop Artemije Radosavljevic, the head of the Raska and Prizren Diocese who is currently based at Gracanica monastery outside Pristina. Sava gave PolOff a copy of Artemije's recent statements in the U.S., in which Artemije characterized the Kosovo conflict as a religious one between Christians and Muslim extremists, and urged the U.S. not to contribute to “the creation of a country of evil, whose government will be in the hands of terrorists.” Sava said that such comments do nothing to protect Kosovo Serbs or their religious sites.5. (SBU) Sava told PolOff that the program of the Reconstruction Implementation Commission for Orthodox Religious Sites in Kosovo (RIC) is on schedule for 2006, and he added that the RIC will issue several more tenders in the coming months.6. (SBU) Sava said that municipal leaders and the international community need to do more to ensure the ongoing security of reconstructed sites, some of which have been further damaged after preliminary reconstruction works were completed in 2005. He said that visiting Council of Europe representative and RIC chairperson Emma Carmichael noticed in early July that part of the new lead roof from St. George Runovic church in Prizren has gone missing since the RIC replaced it in 2005.7. (SBU) COMMENT. Despite obstructionism from Belgrade, moderate Orthodox church leaders in Kosovo continue to struggle to ensure that status negotiations result in effective protection for their sacred sites and monastic communities in Kosovo. END COMMENT.8. (U) Post clears this message in its entirety for release to Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.MCBRIDE
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CABLE 5: “RELIGION AND POLITICS IN SERBIA — THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH”
Canonical ID: 06BELGRADE2065_a
Date: December 26, 2006, 06:55
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
From: U.S. Embassy Belgrade
To: Secretary of State and others
1.4 (b,d)1. (C) Summary: The Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) has played an important political role since the end of the Milosevic era, increasingly collaborating with conservative nationalists to promote a mutually beneficial agenda that encourages conservative values at home and school, discourages strong action on ICTY compliance, and supports a hardline position on Kosovo. The church is likely to remain hardline in the near future as the status of Kosovo is determined, but moderate voices in the church could come to the fore if reformists lead the next coalition government after parliamentary elections January 21. End Summary.Brief History-------------2. (SBU) The SOC grew out of the tradition of eastern Christianity, following Constantinople rather than Rome after the Great Schism. Under Ottoman rule, the church became closely associated with Serbian resistance, which linked it to Serbian national identity and the resulting Serbian monarchy.3. (SBU) The SOC played a controversial role in the Yugoslav wars, sometimes giving mixed messages. On the one hand, the church called for peace and reconciliation, but also issued a number of official statements voicing its support for Serbia keeping the conquered territories, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some individual bishops even went as far as to conduct services blessing soldiers just before important battles.Factions within the Church--------------------------4. (SBU) Church member and critic Mirko Djordjevic described to Emboffs the divisions within the SOC as generally continuing along the same lines of pro-war versus anti-war that arose in the 1990's, with current Patriarch Pavle maintaining a balance between the two. Observers have noted that the more hardline bishops seem to be gaining in power at the expense of the moderates, as evident in the promotion away from the center of power of prominent moderate Irinej Dobrijevic (recently named Bishop of Australia and New Zealand), and the ascent of outspokenly conservative Bosnian clergymen at the last Bishops Conference.SOC Relations with Political Leadership----------------------------------------5. (SBU) While various parties maintain contacts with the factions within the SOC, the party with the strongest church ties is the DSS. Dr. Milan Vukomanovic, a religion and sociology professor at Belgrade University, said the SOC is so linked to the DSS that its fortunes will ascend or descend based on DSS performance at the polls.Desecularization----------------7. (SBU) Critics of the SOC claim that the church is pushing more and more for official integration into the Serbian state. Observers note that it already has de facto official status, particularly when considering the very close ties to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which the Helsinki Committee on Human Rights says “behaves almost like an external government 'service' of the SOC.”SOC Kosovo Policy-----------------10. (C) The church's official stance is that Kosovo must remain an integral part of Serbia, with independence or autonomy out of the question. However, there are factions in the church pushing for a more practical response to the situation. The leading figure of the moderates on this issue has been Bishop Teodosije, who pointed out that the SOC has survived in many states under many circumstances, from the Ottomans to the communists, and that it would continue to survive in Kosovo no matter what the outcome.SOC ICTY Policy---------------11. (C) Internally, we are told, there are bishops on both sides of the debate over whether to turn accused war criminal Ratko Mladic over to the Hague Tribunal. Damjan Krnjevic-Miskovic, an advisor in President Tadic's office for religious affairs, told us that privately, most of the leading figures in the SOC are in favor of Mladic's extradition to The Hague.Prospects for the Future------------------------14. (C) The priesthood is aging. There were only 40 applicants for 300 fully-funded slots offered by the Faculty of Religion for students interested in studying for the priesthood. Church critics and some moderates believe that new ideas are stifled and those who have exposure to the West (particularly clergy drawn from the Diaspora) are shunted to areas where their voices will not be heard.15. (C) As long as conservative nationalists dominate the government, the GoS and SOC hardliners are likely to use each other to mutual advantage. Should reformist democrats like the DS lead the next coalition government, though, there may be more support for moderate viewpoints in the church.Polt
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A NOTE ON WHY THIS MATTERS
Across these five cables, spanning June through December 2006, one figure is described consistently and specifically: then-Father, soon-to-be-Bishop Irinej Dobrijevic. He is described as a moderate voice, as someone who confided concerns about political pressure on the Church, as “the first SOC official to imply publicly that there must be preparations made for the possibility of an independent Kosovo,” and as someone whose promotion to Australia and New Zealand effectively removed him from the center of power in Belgrade. None of these cables describe him as working to help Serbia keep Kosovo. The documents say what they say. Read them yourself.
